There are many paradoxes presented by the relationship of Californians to taxes and spending. Rather than bemoan the seeming disconnects, this short article argues that Californians should be understood as wanting more taxation according to a benefit principle. This approach indicates that benefit charges in California should be increased while general taxes should be decreased through the use of credits against California's income tax. There does not seem to be a legal obstacle to the California Legislature making this change, including Proposition 26. By majority vote, all the legislature needs to do is offer credits against California's income tax for the increased benefit charges that would for the most part be levied by local and/ or specialized government entities in return for services provided.
Since the passage of Proposition 13 in June 1978, Californians have been at the forefront of so-called "ballot box budgeting." In particular, Californians have time and again sought to limit the taxing power of their government-often at all levels. There is evidence of the success of these measures in limited terms; for instance Proposition 13 did successfully cut Californians's property taxes, 1 but there is at least as much evidence that, in general, the size of California's government has not shrunk. 2 Indeed the trajectory of California's government has been to increase to the same extent-and following the same pattern-as that of other comparable states without California's battery of tax limitation initiatives.
There are various ways of explaining these phenomena. For one, there is an arguable agency problem. If Californians do not trust politicians and hence limit their ability to raise taxes, then why should Californians trust the same politicians not to work to circumvent tax limitation regimes?
3 This is all the more true since it seems manifest that Californians do reward politicians for providing more services, and one way that politicians pay for these services is through what Laurie Reynolds calls "dues," a category that subsumes the fees, assessments, and charges that are the subject of this article. According to Reynolds, "dues crucially depend on the relationship between the payer and the purpose for which the revenue raised will be spent. That is, by calculating the charge with a computation of the benefit received by the payer or to offset the cost imposed on the general population by the payer's activity, dues treat government activities just like any other market transaction in a consumer economy." 4 As the last part of this short quotation suggests, one can interpret the rise of dues as a sign of a troubling privatization of government services, ei-ther desired by voters or imposed on them by politicians. 5 Alternatively, one might interpret the curious path of California as determined by the ambivalence of voter preferences-voters hate taxes and want services and so they get some increase in dues, but also deficits. 6 I would like to propose another explanation for the behavior of California voters, one that does not require that California voters are essentially confused about taxes and government or even are fundamentally hostile to the public sphere. Rather, I suggest that Californians have been groping for a different way to fund their government: to the extent possible, they want their government funded according to the benefit principle. At the heart of the benefit principle is the proposition that, as much as possible, the government should be funded like any service provider in the private sector. Charges should be paid on the basis of a voluntary quid pro quo between citizen and government. 7 I observe that, at least implicitly, the governor's proposed realignment-i.e., shifting more responsibilities back to local governments-endorses such a benefit principle. 8 Leaving aside the theoretical arguments for so-called benefit taxation, 9 I think that one can argue persuasively that significant portions of California's tax system once more closely hewed to a benefit tax framework, and this was consistent with large public undertakings. Most obviously, special benefit assessments were once more common in California and elsewhere, financing a significant amount of essential backbone infrastructure, 10 including major portions of California's water system.
One way to capture the shift in California public finance over the last few decades is to note that the legislature is currently hoping that the voters of California approve $11.4 billion in general obligation bonds to improve water infrastructure 11 -these bonds will be paid back by California's General Fund, which is funded primarily by the state income and sales taxes. It is not hard to imagine an argument for why all the people of California (and even the United States) have a stake in California's water infrastructure, but it is also reasonable to believe that the lion's share of the cost for these improvements should be borne by the immediate beneficiaries of these improvements.
12 After all, it is precisely landowners with land near the strengthened levies who will realize the value of these improvements in increased land values. 13 Furthermore, these landowners are best situated to assess and monitor these government expenditures.
The shift in connection with water infrastructure is just one example, and I realize there is ample room for debate as to what extent California's waves of tax revolts can be explained as a revolt for benefit taxation. Nevertheless, this preference for benefit taxation is both plausible and analytically tractable, and it seems appropriate to attribute such a viable preference to voters.
14 A shift to benefit taxation also indicates a way forward for California financially given the current mismatch between revenues and expenses. And not just forward to a more stable future, but also towards a more efficient future, a small step backwards toward a 21st century tax system.
15 Even beyond efficiency, if the changes advocated herein spur (appropriate) investment (and reinvestment) in California's capital stock, then they are a means for California to achieve both greater short-term and long-term growth.
Let us go back to the funding of water infrastructure to outline this approach. One big theoretical problem with imposing assessments large enough to fund the needed improvements is that many landowners do not currently have sufficient cash. This can be ameliorated somewhat by amortizing the cost for the improvement-say over the lifetime of a project financed by bonds. Still, many individual landowners might not have even the amortized cash payments.
16 Furthermore, and relatedly, a flat assessment according to benefit received would likely be somewhat regressive, affecting poor landowners rich only in land in the same proportion as wealthy agro-businesses.
These are real concerns. Nevertheless, I think that the state has made a mistake in opting to use the expenditure of general income and sales taxes to fund specific improvements that in many cases can fund themselves. This is because the state can both take advantage of beneficiary financing and mitigate the issues with this kind of financing though use of the income tax.
17 How can the state help the assessment mechanism along? For one, it could allow these kinds of assessments to be deducted from state income taxes-current law does not allow this. 18 It could be objected that the value of a deduction is tied to the marginal state income tax rate of the taxpayer and so in fact this is not much of a help if the idea is to soften assessments for those who are cash poor. Yet this deduction can be a credit, even a refundable credit; there are already such credits in the federal and state income tax codes.
19 If this change is to make the assessments more progressive, then, like many other credits, it would phase out at higher income levels.
There are other sound reasons to use credits rather than direct expenditures; in this case it is the landowners who have the local knowledge as to the desired improvements and so it makes sense on efficiency and administrability grounds to defer to this local knowledge. 20 Of course, using tax credits to spur local investment while mitigating liquidity problems is not free, but this system can be designed to be less burdensome on the General Fund than just paying for these improvements with everyone's taxes. And so this proposal can also be a part of the solution to California's chronic budget problems.
The state should endeavor to enact this shift back towards benefit taxation broadly. There can be tax credits for fees paid in connection with carbon mitigation, for tuition paid to California institutions of higher learning, and for taxes paid to local government entities. A new local tax credit could be a spur for realignment and is consistent with the benefit principle to the extent that many local taxes, especially for schools, can be rightfully viewed as benefit taxes (at least in large part).
All in all, as will be sketched in the final section of this paper, these expedients can cumulatively amount to a significant revenue solution. But the scope is not the only issue, as this shift would also lead to more efficient and stable allocation of resources over the long term, which is an independent virtue of this proposal. Fiscal volatility imposes its own costs on all Californians, particularly the most vulnerable.
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Preliminary Legal Analysis
To what extent do current legal and political arrangements allow for such a shift? The answer to this question is indeterminate, but generally hopeful. It takes a majority of the state legislature to pass tax cuts, though I observe that tax breaks that more efficiently target government revenue should garner bipartisan support.
Both at the state and local level, there is no inherent obstacle to raising the assessment and fees that a shift to more benefit-style taxation would require. To be sure, recent changes to the California Constitution require that the government bear the burden of demonstrating a tight connection between the cost assessed and the benefit received. Yet many of the fees we are discussing are of the most traditional type imaginable-assessment-type financing built many of California's levees and I do not believe that changes to California's Constitution prevents assessments from rebuilding these same levees. To the contrary, California voters have signaled that they do not want assessment financing used beyond these parameters, and so I believe that enabling assessment financing is a key way to give the voters what they (reasonably) want, not to flaunt their wishes. From this perspective, what the state needs to do is to use its resources to jumpstart more beneficiary financing.
Introducing Proposition 26
Proposition 26, passed by the voters this past November (2010) , targeted the imposition of fees at the state and local level without a two-thirds majority either of the state legislature or of local voters. Proposition 26 comes to mind immediately as standing in the way of the proposal herein. Accordingly, I will analyze Proposition 26 in some depth below-and identify areas of indeterminacy, but I will begin by listing various types of fees that are not threatened by Proposition 26.
Proposition 26 operates by changing the definition of a "tax" to include "any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by the State,"
22 and taxes require a two-thirds vote. However, Proposition 26 clearly excludes several kinds of fees from the definition of a "tax."
These exclusions are numerous and important. The following state-level charge is not a tax and is not subject to the two-thirds requirement: "[a] charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the State of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege to the payor."
23 This exclusion sounds like it should exclude benefit assessments, which makes sense because their use is already governed-and limited-by Proposition 218. Accordingly, the parallel provision governing local governments declares as much, excluding from the definition of a "tax," "[a]ssessments and property-related fees imposed in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII D [added by Prop 218] ."
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Local governments can also continue to levy development impact fees.
25 These fees already had to be reasonable and proportionate and may well have fit under one of the more general exclusions, but Proposition 26 makes their exclusion explicit: "A charge imposed as a condition of property development" is excluded from the definition of a tax.
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Other regular direct payments for services, such as tuition, tolls or bus fare, are also excluded from the definition of a tax: "A charge imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the state of providing the service or product to the payor."
27 Given the value that California's public colleges and universities continue to provide, this requirement should not pose a big hurdle for any education institution seeking to raise fees.
These exceptions mean that, within the already existing parameters for raising these fees-parameters that do not include a two-thirds majority -all of these kinds of fees can be raised by the state or other government entities.
The Bite of Proposition 26
So what does Proposition 26 impact? A kind of charge that is not excluded from the definition of a "tax," but what is that? The key finding from Proposition 26 is somewhat mysterious. It reads:
Fees couched as "regulatory" but which exceed the reasonable costs of actual regulation or are simply imposed to raise revenue for a new program and are not part of any licensing or permitting program are actually taxes and should be subject to the limitations applicable to the imposition of taxes.
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Why is regulatory in scare quotes? By what standard is "actual" regulation to be measured? What is an example of a purportedly regulatory fee? There is little need to guess, actually. The proponents of Proposition 26 were targeting the decision of the California Supreme Court in Sinclair Paint Company v. State Board of Equalization. This was a decision that upheld the imposition of "regulatory fees" even though the challengers claimed that the fee was simply a means of raising revenue for a new program that did not benefit them. 29 The ballot analysis prepared by the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst explicitly discusses Sinclair at length. This reference to Sinclair is particularly significant since California courts typically look to ballot statements-and especially the summary of the Legislative Analyst-in construing a proposition.
30 Furthermore, in doing so courts attribute fairly sophisticated understanding of the legal issues at stake to the voters.
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What Was Sinclair about?
The plaintiff, the Sinclair Paint Company, challenged the fees levied upon it as part of the "Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act of 1991." As the California Supreme Court explained, "[t]he Act provided evaluation, screening, and medically necessary follow-up services for children who were deemed potential victims of lead poisoning. The Act's program was entirely supported by 'fees' assessed on manufacturers or other persons contributing to environmental lead contamination." 32 The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff (Sinclair) that these fees were not special assessments and were not development impact fees and, indeed, the court used language that we see clear echoes of in Proposition 26:
According to [the plaintiff], "because the present fees have been imposed solely to defray the cost of the state's program of evaluation, screening, and follow-up services for children determined to be at risk for lead poisoning, they are not analogous to either special assessments or development fees, for they neither reimburse the state for special benefits conferred on manufacturers of lead-based products nor compensate the state for governmental privileges granted to those manufacturers. As the Court of Appeal observed, the fees challenged here 'do not constitute payment for a government benefit or services.'"
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Though the California Supreme Court agreed that the fees in question were not special assessments or development fees, it found the fees to be nontaxes (and thus requiring only a majority vote) because they were "regulatory fees." Regulatory fees are the imposition of fees under the police power-as to the act in question, the court found that "[i]t requires manufacturers and other persons whose products have exposed children to lead contamination to bear a fair share of the cost of mitigating the adverse health effects their products created in the community. Viewed as a 'mitigating effects' measure, it is comparable in character to similar police power measures imposing fees to defray the actual or anticipated adverse effects of various business operations."
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If one accepts that Proposition 26 takes aim at Sinclair, then this broad guidance as to the kind of fee that was at issue in Sinclair is not very helpful. After all, many fees-including all development impact fees-are passed to mitigate impacts of a certain activity and the ultimate power to levy such fees arises from the police power.
The Legislative Analyst identified two special features of the fees at issue in Sinclair: (1) broadness of benefit and (2) lack of other duty. These features were present in Sinclair, but are not all that much more precise. After all the Sinclair court made it clear that:
We observe that [the plaintiff], in moving for summary judgment, did not contend that the fees exceed in amount the reasonable cost of providing the protective services for which the fees are charged, or that the fees were levied for any unrelated revenue purposes. 35 Put in other words, Sinclair never stood for the proposition that fees did not need to be proportional and related to the impact they were to mitigate.
36 But there is something special about the fees approved in Sinclair; I think that the troubling feature was that they were retroactive 37 -retroactivity explains the two features highlighted by the Legislative Analyst. That is, it is reasonable to believe that firms that have been operating for decades did not benefit from the imposition of this fee. Relatedly, since the fee was retroactive, it is not clear how it could have been related to any duty that these particular manufacturers had. And so one target of Proposition 26 is a fee on activities that have been completed and so the voluntary nature of the action triggering the fee is attenuated. Such fees do more strongly resemble taxes, which are defined in part by being coercive. Leaving aside the merits of the California Supreme Court's analysis in Sinclair, 38 the voters have now decided that such fees are similar enough to taxes to be treated as taxes for voting purposes.
Perhaps Proposition 26 goes further. The Legislative Analyst's analysis suggests that Prop 26 is targeted towards any fee that provides a relatively diffuse benefit. And so the Legislative Analyst states:
Generally, the types of fees and charges that would become taxes under the measure are ones that government imposes to address health, environmental, or other societal or economic concerns. Figure 3 provides examples of some regulatory fees that could be considered taxes, in part or in whole, under the measure.
For instance, per the Legislative Analyst, the "oil recycling fee" would seem to be in danger from Proposition 26.
The Legislative Analyst says such fees "could be considered" taxes (emphasis added), and this is a reasonable interpretation of the proposition. Interestingly, however, the proponents of Proposition 26 did not think it went this far. Here, maintaining the formatting of the ballot argument, are the proponents of Prop 26: Prop. 26 protects legitimate fees and WON'T ELIMINATE OR PHASE OUT ANY OF CALIFORNIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL OR CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS, including:
• 39 To be sure, the opponents of Proposition 26 claimed that such environmental fees would be impacted by Proposition 26 in the ballot pamphlet and, as we saw, the Legislative Analyst agreed with this potentiality. 40 Nevertheless, aside from the reasonable, but so far unavailing, argument that the view of the proponents should be given special deference, 41 there is another reason why the views of the proponents should be heeded and that is that theirs is quite a reasonable interpretation of the actual language of Proposition 26 and its specific legal history. As to legal history, we saw that Sinclair, clearly the target of Prop 26, was primarily novel in its acceptance of a retroactive fee. As for more traditional fees, those levied on the voluntary actions of taxpayers and in receipt of a direct benefit, we saw that the language of Proposition 26 assiduously avoided impacting those fees. And, many of these exclusions are written in broad terms, particularly the notion that a fee is not a tax if it is for a "specific privilege granted."
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Still, Proposition 26 was clearly meant to limit fees, including fees that violate at least the spirit of previous revenue limitation measures, such as Propositions 13 and 218. 43 Courts have rightly been sensitive to the larger spirit of what the voters enacted. 44 There is, however, another provision of Proposition 26 that provides courts with a tractable way to vindicate this spirit. Proposition 26 adds Section 3(d) to Article 13A (and (1)(e)(7) to 13D for local governments); it reads:
The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.
This change to the law should be understood with several key pieces of context. First, the general rule in California and elsewhere had been for courts to defer to legislative findings on matters such as the amount of fees and assessments.
45 Second, there is little doubt that perpetual fiscal crises have contributed to more aggressive use of fees and assessments. Third, in 1996, the voters passed Proposition 218, which similarly changed the presumption to be one against the government in connection with assessments:
In any legal action contesting the validity of any assessment, the burden shall be on the agency to demonstrate that the property or properties in question receive a special benefit over and above the benefits conferred on the public at large and that the amount of any contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater than, the benefits conferred on the property or properties in question. 46 Just a few years ago, in Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority, the California Supreme Court decided the details of this burden shift, and essentially held that the courts would review legislative findings de novo. 47 As an aside, it should be noted that the assessment that was invalidated by the court in this case was aggressive even by the looser standards that prevailed before Proposition 218-and this assessment was imposed after Proposition 218.
What does all this mean in the context of Proposition 26? It means that courts may well, quite reasonably, accord little deference to legislative findings made by any level of California government. In so doing, they will not only vindicate the letter of Proposition 13 and its progeny, but their spirit. That is, legislators cannot close a budget gap or fund a program by opting to levy a fee as part of a late-night negotiation. Many fees excluded from the ambit Proposition 26, such as special assessments, generally include their own requirements for building a careful record, but as for those fees that are not covered by Proposition 26 but do not have their own statutory requirement to build a careful record -these fees, I believe, must also be supported by a scrupulously developed record because of the burden shift.
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006?
What about the fees related to the imposition of AB 32-the "Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006"? First, there is a sound argument that the fees authorized by AB 32 fall under the first exception to Proposition 26 discussed above, namely that these fees are a "charge imposed for a specific benefit or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the State of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege to the payor." 48 There are two parts of AB 32 that can satisfy this exclusion. First, and most clearly, there is Health and Safety Code 38597, which provides that "the [California Air Resources Board-"CARB"] may adopt by regulation, after a public workshop, a schedule of fees to be paid by the sources of greenhouse gas emissions regulated pursuant to this division, consistent with Section 57001. The revenues collected pursuant to this section, shall be deposited into the Air Pollution Control Fund and are available upon appropriation, by the legislature, for purposes of carrying out this division." The board has already issued a regulation governing such fees 49 and they are to be imposed upon approximate 350 emitters 50 of especially problematic gasses. 51 These gasses are precisely those for which a ready alternative is not easily found and so it is a privilege for a business to be able to use such destructive gasses for a small mitigation fee.
52 Certainly, unlike the retroactive fee in Sinclair, a business could prospectively choose to use less of these gasses, thereby paying a smaller fee (or no fee).
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The CARB can also impose fees of a type under its authority granted by Section 38570, which states "The state board may include in the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 38562 the use of market-based compliance mechanisms to comply with the regulations." Under 38505(k)(2), a "market-based compliance mechanism" may include: "Greenhouse gas emissions exchanges, banking, credits, and other transactions, governed by rules and protocols established by the state board . . . ." Charging some entities for allowances to emit greenhouse gasses seems consistent with this mandate, as distributing tradable credits would be 54 -not being given a credit or being forced to buy one is the economic equivalent of a fee. Not only does the board seem to have the authority under AB 32 to impose fees of this type, but these fees are consistent with Proposition 26 because emitters are allowed to voluntarily change their behavior in order to reduce the amount of the fee-indeed, that is the whole point.
Under AB 32, the board has an additional power unaffected by Proposition 26, which is the power to penalize emitters who do not comply with its regulations; even more importantly, perhaps, the board can enjoin noncompliance. 55 Depending on the size of the penalties and the rigor of its enforcement, the board can significantly alter the effectiveness of its regulations and any associated revenue. Proposition 26 explicitly excludes fines or penalties from its ambit. 56 In the end, there is ambiguity as to whether or not any proposed AB 32 fees fit Proposition 26's exception as to a specific benefit granted. However, it is not ambiguous that Proposition 26 does not apply to any fees adopted before January 1, 2010; AB 32 was adopted in 2006. The presumption is that propositions do not apply retroactively, a presumption that can only be overcome with clear intent; here the clear intent only goes back to January 2010. 57 Proposition 26 is clear that it is to apply back to January 2010, 58 but there is no hint that it is to apply any further back in time, which is a reasonable result given that the sponsors of Proposition 26 stated "Proposition 26 doesn't change or undermine a single law protecting our air, ocean, waterways or forests" 59 and Proposition 23-a proposition aimed at repealing AB 32-failed by a margin even greater than that by which Proposition 26 passed (52.5% for Prop 26, 61.6% against Prop 23). Assuming that AB 32 fees can proceed, then allowing credits through a progressive income tax would be a natural way to implement a "cap and dividend" system in order to mitigate the possibly regressive impact of any AB 32 fees. This is not the place to endorse such a system, only to note that this approach to fighting global warming has a lot to be said for it, 61 and, though the state may end up backing in to this approach, it could reasonably be thought of as a first-best solution to the problem.
Some Back-of-the-Envelope Numbers
So instituting income tax credits for fees is desirable theoretically and possible politically and legally, but is it worth the trouble? I think it might be. Here are some preliminary numerical musings.
There are approximately 150,000 California resident undergraduates in the UC system.
62 Let us propose a California education credit along the lines of the current federal Lifetime Learning Credit.
63 This (nonrefundable) credit is worth up to $2,000 and phases out for (joint) incomes between $120,000 to $130,000. 64 At the maximum, such a credit would cost the California General Fund $300 million (150,000 x $2,000). There are two big reasons why this would not cost the General Fund this much. First, the $300 million credit will be paired with a $300 million spending cut, so at worst the credit will be a wash for the General Fund. Second, the phaseout of the credit will mean some percentage of the $300 million in credits will not be spent by the state. 65 One recent report from UC suggested that the income distribution of UC parents with income over $72,000 year is about 40%, and so let us suppose that the phaseout on this hypothetical credit is 100% at $72,000.
66 This means, roughly, that the state can save $120 million dollars (40% of $300 million) while, in effect, not cutting UC undergraduate funding at all because UC will benefit from the full $300 million tuition increase. 67 There are also tens of thousands of resident graduate students in the UC system, many of them in professional programs. The California State University system has over 400,000 students 68 and the California Community College system serves well over two million students. 69 Though this is not the place to recommend a multitiered credit system, one seems appropriate; for instance, a higher credit amount for professional schools (that can perhaps rollover) versus a higher refundable percentage for community college students. 70 Given these other plausible avenues and the basic scale of the $120 million in savings from a simple federal-style credit just for UC undergraduates, it would seem reasonable to suggest that such credits could in aggregate save the General Fund several hundred million dollars per year, while significantly expanding the benefit principle.
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As for the resources the state dedicates to water infrastructure, a significant, if not dominant, portion seems to come from all the state's taxpayers-with the proposed new $11 billion bond more of the same. I will propose a modest program here too-one specifically targeted at flood control. Some background: potentially hundreds of millions of dollars from the proposed bond measure is available for flood control. 72 The state recently hit a maximum of spending almost $1 billion dollars per year on flood control (2007-08). However, current spending on flood control is now much less (about $300 million) and, as explained by a leading commentator, " [l] ocal contributions can be difficult to increase, given that local assessments require voter approval." 73 Indeed, so far as I can tell the total local contribution made by property assessments to "Flood Control and Water Conservation" was about $100 million in 2007-08-that is, before the current financial crisis. 74 The anemic level of assessments is a problem that transcends the additional hurdles imposed on assessments by Proposition 218. Maintaining a levee would seem to be about the most traditional use of assessment financing possible, and so such an assessment should be permissible under the changes to the substantive law of assessments made by Proposition 218, though procedurally Proposition 218 does make it harder to proceed. Still, landowners can approve such an assessment, but presumably are held back in part for economic reasons, especially liquidity concerns. One solution is to allow for deferred payment of assessments (say when the property is sold), but the state can also utilize tax credits. Or I propose that the state can do both at once. For instance, there can be a $1,000 credit for assessments used towards (state-approved) flood-control projects. 75 For those landowners who would not benefit from the credit because of the phaseout, then some percentage of the assessment (say 40%) can be deferred until the property is sold. This would help large landowners who might still have liquidity concerns. It could be objected against the deferral proposal that this would still mean that the state would have to front the money to pay off the bondholders for these projects, but that is still a big improvement from the state never being reimbursed at all for its outlays for projects that provide significant private benefits.
It is hard to assess how large a budget solution the water infrastructure shift might amount to, but I am going to suggest that it is reasonable to surmise that it too could amount to several hundred million dollars per year. On one pessimistic hand, even if the state gives a big boost to local flood control spending through credits and deferrals, (say making $1 billion available) it is not clear how many landowners will take the state up on the offer and how much the credits will actually cost (I do not even have a rough calculation on phaseouts as to this hypothetical water credit). On the other hand, flood control is only one aspect of water policy, and these other aspects, such as improving water efficiency and quality, can also be improved by a benefit approach. 76 And, we must remember that the numbers we are discussing get very large very fast; the annual debt service on the proposed new water bonds will likely be $1 billion per year. To the extent that these assessments replace or even delay General Fund borrowing, these are savings with interest. 77 In addition, there are independent reasons for wanting to decrease the amount of annual debt service paid out of the General Fund because the interest expense crowds out other needs and weakens the state's credit rating (which increases the interest expense). 78 Finally, this is not all about budget numbers; a marginal increase in funding and better allocation of resources that helps avoid a catastrophic flood in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is a good on many different levels.
Defining the state's current shortfall is difficult; the number now in use by the governor is $25 billion. 79 Let us stick to that figure and note as well that the governor has offered a ratio of 1 to 1 of cuts to revenue increases. 80 This means that the General Fund needs $12 billion in new revenue, and this is going to be quite a challenge. 81 The solutions just now sketched amount to at most $1 billion, or less than 10% of the required total.
82 I think this percentage might be higher with more study of possible areas in which to apply it, particularly local taxation generally. 83 Furthermore, there is evidence that the structural deficit is lower than $25 billion (perhaps about half that amount), 84 and so even a modest recovery in California's economy will make these revenue solutions even more significant relative to the real underlying fiscal imbalance. At the very least, these solutions will help stabilize California's revenue system and better allocate its resources. Indeed, to the extent that these changes help stimulate (smart) investment in physical and human capital, then California is likely to net a handsome rate of return over the short and long terms.
Conclusion
There are ample grounds to despair of California's ability to develop an efficient and fair taxing system that provides enough revenue for the services the voters demand. One can focus on the mixed messages that the voters have sent or the external constraints placed on California by federal law or the internal constraints Californians have placed on themselves. Nevertheless a significant portion of the services Californians want can be funded through efficient benefit-type taxation and this system can be made fair by means of California's income tax. So far as I know, there are no major internal or external constraints to such an expedient. Indeed, I think one can make a plausible argument that this is the back to the future tax system that the voters of California have been shuffling toward for decades.
that it be followed more closely. 15 The COTCE Report was supposed to lead us to such a system, but its many limitations-some self-imposed-have prevented its novel proposal from being adopted. See Kirk Stark, Houdini Tax Reform, California Policy Options (Nov. 2010). The current piece can be read as proposing a different-and achievable-way to move towards a more efficient revenue system. I propose a slightly different application of the benefit tax principle in Darien Shanske, "Putting the California Constitution (Back) to Work: A Blueprint for Clearing Legal Roadblocks to Proper Infrastructure Finance" 54 State Tax Notes 567 (2009). There I observe that there are ways that Proposition 218 in particular obstructs the use of the benefit principle, and I argue that it would be advisable to amend the constitution to ameliorate these problems. I still think these changes would be meritorious, especially if made in sync with the credit system I propose here. Granted, to the extent that Californians have undermined the benefit principle through Proposition 218 (and Proposition 13), then they have in a sense not embraced the benefit principle. But I think these changes should not be read as undermining a general preference for benefit taxation-what they do indicate is that the signal from the voters has been noisy. 16 34 Id. at 1356. This is not an idiosyncratic definition of a "regulatory fee." As a leading local government scholar puts it:
[F]or a regulatory fee intended to offset the cost of regulating a fee payer whose activity imposes some costs on the community, the fee is nominally voluntary since the duty to pay arises from the payer's decision to undertake the activity subject to regulation. By not consuming the service or avoiding the activity, the payer could avoid the charge or fee. So, too, by reducing the amount of service consumed or the amount of activity subject to regulation, the payer can reduce her liability. Lacking the coerciveness that is the hallmark of a tax, user charges and regulatory fees have traditionally been treated as not subject to many of the rules applicable to taxes. Richard Briffault, "Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law" 34 Rutgers L. J. 907, 934-35 (2003) . Importantly, in the next paragraph Briffault identifies Sinclair as an aggressive interpretation of the regulatory fee concept: "[S]ome state courts have validated regulatory fees even when a particular firm's fee is not a result of the costs attributable to that firm-thereby reducing the ability of the firm to use changes in its behavior to control its fee liability and thus undermining the voluntary nature of the fee." I think that the retroactivity of the fee in Sinclair is at the heart of what makes this fee more coercive and more like a tax.
35 Sinclair at 1356. 36 See also id. at 1358. 37 See e.g., id. at 1356 ("According to [the plaintiff] Sinclair, the challenged fees were in effect "taxes" because the compulsory revenue measure that imposed them was not part of a regulatory effort.); id. at 1357 ("The fact that the challenged fees were charged after, rather than before, the product's adverse effects were realized is immaterial to the question whether the measure imposes valid regulatory fees rather than taxes."). 38 At this point, the merits of Sinclair are moot, though it should be noted that, even under the law as it stood before Proposition 26, California courts used the analysis in Sinclair to find certain fees to in fact be taxes. See, e.g., Bay Area Cellular Tel. Co. v. City of Union City, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Furthermore, in the realm of economic theory, the difference between a fee and a tax is murky at best, as a fee imposed on a specific activity could also be interpreted as an excise tax on that activity, a tax scaled to the size of the externality caused by that activity. The situation is even harder with regulatory fees, as it has long been understood that taxation and regulation are substitutes. Richard A. Posner, "Taxation as Regulation" 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 22 (1971). One seeming irony of Proposition 26 is therefore that it incentivizes California governments to act by means of regulation even when, pragmatically, a fee would make more sense. This is not a prospect that has delighted commentators generally interested in a smaller government. See, for example, Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution 166 (1980) ("It is relatively easy to envisage a federal budget making up no more than 20 percent of GNP that would reflect more interference with personal liberties than an alternative budget of 40 percent of GNP, but with substantially less direct regulation."). 
